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Abstract
Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments, such as
‘burning one’s bridges’. Since such strategic moves can appear somewhat counter-
intuitive, we conducted an experiment to see whether people make the predicted
strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining situation. A player
can make a strategic move of committing to not seeing what the other player
will demand. Our data show that the subjects do, but after substantial time,
learn to make the predicted strategic move. Our results lend support to game
theory models that stress the relevance of strategic moves, but they also show
that players need time to learn to make the strategic move.
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1 Introduction
A crucial insight from game theory is that a player involved in an interactive situation
can gain from making what Schelling (1960) calls a strategic move. Well-known exam-
ples are moving before someone else to get a ﬁrst-mover advantage (Schelling, 1960,
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and Tirole, 1988); signing contracts with third-parties (Aghion and Bolton, 1985, and
Bensaid and Gary-Bobo, 1993); burning money (Ben-Porath and Dekel, 1992, van
Damme, 1989, Huck and Mu¨ller, 2005); strategic delegation (Fershtman and Gneezy,
2001, Fershtman and Kalai, 1997, and Schelling, 1960); changing the information
structure (Hauk and Hurkens, 2001, Hurkens and Vulkan, 2006, and Schelling, 1960).
These important game-theoretic results about strategic moves lead naturally to
an empirical question: Do decision makers in practice understand and appreciate the
usefulness of making these strategic moves? This, we believe, is a non-trivial issue: the
strategic moves mentioned above are chacaterized by a deliberate restriction of one’s
freedom of action, a reduction of one’s payoﬀs from certain outcomes, or an avoidance
of information. It could be that most decision makers would prefer not to engage
in such activities since they may appear counterintuitive and irrational. Perhaps,
due to bounded rationality and cognitive biases, decision makers would underestimate
or completely ignore the strategic impact of the strategic move on the opponent’s
behavior. Such biases have been experimentally documented in other, mostly non-
strategic, decision problems. See Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber (2006) and the
references therein.
To explore these issues in a simple and controlled environment, we run experiments
using a simple game, namely a sequential version of the Nash Demand Game (Nash,
1953). One player, A, makes a demand for a share of an exogenously given amount
of money. Then another player, B, makes a demand. If the sum of the demands do
not exceed the available amount, each player gets the money he demanded; otherwise
each player gets zero. We consider a strategic move that we call strategic information
acquisition. In our ﬁrst treatment, player B can, before player A makes a demand,
commit himself to see A’s demand or not before B makes his demand, and A observes
B’s commitment. We refer to this as the Commitment game. In this game, if B decides
not to see A’s demand, it is common knowledge that B is an uninformed second-mover.
If, on the other hand, B decides to see A’s demand, it is common knowledge that B is
an informed second mover. Our theoretical prediction is that B will make the strategic
move of not seeing A’s demand.
In our second treatment player B again commits to see player A’s demand or not
before B makes his demand, but now A does not observe what B committed himself
to. This is the Unobserved Commitment game. Theory predicts that player B should
now see player A’s demand, since A cannot condition his demand on B’s commitment
decision. In our third treatment, the No Commitment treatment, B has no commit-
ment move available: he decides to be informed about player A’s demand or not after
player A had made his demand. Indeed, since player B’s decision whether or not to see
player A’s demand is not observed by player A in the Unobserved Commitment and
the No Commitment games, game theory views the two games as strategically equiv-
alent. The experimental literature has however documented behavioral diﬀerences in
games that, such as the Unobserved and No Commitment games, diﬀer only in the
order but not observability of moves. This is referred to as physical timing eﬀects, or
virtual observability. See Gu¨th, Huck, and Rapoport (1989), Huck and Mu¨ller (2005),
and Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2006). By comparing behavior in the Unobserved
Commitment and the No Commitment games, we can see whether physical timing
signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the making of strategic moves.
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Our main purpose is to see how a given commitment opportunity is used by play-
ers, not how commitments are created. We therefore deliberately avoid specifying the
exact way in which players achieve commitment. A more rich design would specify the
exact commitment technology (third-party contracts, strategic delegation, inability to
receive information, and so on), how costly and easily reversible the commitment is
(see Muthoo, 1996) and the extent to which (contractual) commitments can be re-
negotiated. We discuss this further in Section 5. Our simple set-up can be interpreted
as a reduced-form model of a more complicated situation where commitment is (suf-
ﬁciently) cheap and where it is (suﬃciently) costly to re-negotiate the commitment.
Our experimental ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: Players learn over time
to make the strategic moves that game theory predicts for our treatments, and the
physical timing eﬀects mentioned above are weak or non-existing. The time required
for learning depends, however, on the treatment: in the Commitment treatment the
time needed for player Bs to learn that it is optimal to avoid information is considerably
longer than the time they need in the Unobserved Commitment and No Commitment
treatment to learn that information is optimal. We interpret this learning asymmetry
as evidence that players bring with them into the lab an ‘information is good’ bias.
Such a bias is plausible since information is typically viewed as desirable in most
everyday decision problems; see for example Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber (2006).
When put in a strategic situation such as the Commitment treatment, however, this
bias leads to information being collected. Since this tends to give player B a low
payoﬀ, player Bs over time unlearn the bias. More generally, therefore, our experiment
provides support for models stressing the relevance of strategic moves, when it is
acknowledged that decision makers need ample time to learn to make the strategic
moves.
Our results contribute to a quite small literature of experimental work on whether
people make optimal strategic moves. We are only aware of the unpublished paper by
Andreoni (2005), and the published works of Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Huck and
Mu¨ller (2005), Morgan and Vardy (2004), and Poulsen and Tan (2006). We describe
in Section 6 how our work relates to these contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theo-
retical predictions. Section 3 explains the design of the experiment and how it was
conducted. Section 4 reports our ﬁndings. In Section 5 we discuss our ﬁndings and the
design, and outline possible future research. We relate our experimental design and
results to the existing literature in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The instructions
are in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Predictions
There are two players, i = A,B, and a sum of money, X. Let  denote the smallest
monetary unit. The set of feasible demands is Z = {0, , 2, ..., X − ,X}. Denote
player i’s demand by xi, i = A,B, where xi ∈ Z. If xA + xB ≤ X, each player gets
what he demanded. If xA + xB > X, each player gets zero. We assume all players are
rational, seek to maximize their expected money earnings, and that this is common
knowledge.
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2.1 The Benchmark Game (BM)
The Benchmark game is a sequential Nash Demand Game with perfect information.
Player A ﬁrst makes a demand, xA. Player B sees player A’s demand and then B
makes his demand, xB . The theoretical prediction is that player A in equilibrium gets
almost all the money. More precisely, there are two pure-strategy subgame-perfect
equilibria. In the ﬁrst subgame-perfect equilibrium, player A demands all the money,
x∗A = X, and player B demands x
∗
B = 1 − xA for any demand xA made by player A.
In the second subgame-perfect equilibrium, player A demands x∗A = X − , where  is
the smallest monetary unit, and player B demands x∗B = X − xA for any demand xA
with xA < X, and makes some demand x
∗
B > 0 for xA = X.
2.2 The Commitment Game (C)
In the Commitment game player B ﬁrst irrevocably decides whether or not to see the
demand that player A will make. We refer to this as B’s information decision. Player
A observes which information decision B made, and then player A makes his demand.
Player B then sees player A’s demand or not, as determined by his information deci-
sion. Finally player B makes his demand. We restrict, for simplicity and without loss
of generality, B’s information decision to be a pure yes/no choice.
Suppose ﬁrst player B decides to see player A’s demand. The subgame that follows
is identical to the Benchmark game, so in any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
Commitment game player B gets almost zero if he sees player A’s demand. Suppose
next player B decides not to see player A’s demand. In the subgame that follows it
is common knowledge that B does not see A’s demand when B makes his demand.
Any feasible pair of demands (xA, xB) such that xA + xB = X is a Nash equilibrium
of this subgame. Our prediction will be based on the unique symmetric pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, namely that each player demands half of the money. Thus in
any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game, player B gets half of X if he
decides not to see player A’s demand. It is thus optimal for B to decide not to see
A’s demand. The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the Commitment game is therefore:
Player B decides not to see player A’s demand and B demands half of the money when
it is his turn to make a demand; if player A observes that player B decided not to
see player A’s demand, player A demands half of the money; and if player A observes
that player B decided to see player A’s demand, then player A demands (almost) all
the money and player B demands the rest.
This theoretical prediction is we believe quite intuitive: if player B decides not to
see player A’s demand, a sequential Nash Demand Game with imperfect information
is played, and this is strategically equivalent to a simultaneous-move Nash Demand
Game. In this game we expect each player to demand half of the money. If B decides
to see player A’s demand, B becomes second mover in a sequential Nash Demand
Game with perfect information, and in this game B should expect to get signiﬁcantly
less than half of the money. We predict that B prefers to play the former game and
so decides not to see player A’s demand.
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2.3 The Unobserved Commitment Game (UC)
In the Unobserved Commitment game, Player B ﬁrst irrevocably decides whether or
not to see player A’s demand, as in the Commitment game. Player A does however
not learn B’s information decision. In other words, player A knows that B has made
some information decision (to see or not to see player A’s demand), but player A does
not know which information decision B made. Then player A makes a demand. After
this player B sees player A’s demand or not, as determined by player B’s information
decision. Finally player B makes his demand.
There are many Nash equilibria in this game. For example, the B strategy of
not seeing player A’s demand and demanding one-half and the player A strategy of
demanding one-half is a Nash equilibrium. We observe however that the B strategy
of seeing player A’s demand and playing a best reply to player A’s demand (that
is, demanding xB = X − xA when seeing that player A demanded xA < X and
making any feasible demand when seeing xA = X) weakly dominates any other B
strategy. Assuming that player B avoids dominated strategies, it follows that player
B decides to see player A’s demand. This being common knowledge, the players’
equilibrium demands are identical to those in the Benchmark game. Intuitively, since
B’s information decision is not observed by player A, there can be no strategic eﬀect
of B’s information decision on the demand that player A subsequently makes. It is
then best for B to decide to see A’s demand.
2.4 The No Commitment Game (NC)
In the No Commitment game, player B has no opportunity to commit to see player
A’s demand or not before player A makes a demand. The order of moves are: player
A ﬁrst makes a demand. Then player B decides whether or not to see player A’s
demand. Finally, player B makes his demand. As in the Unobserved Commitment
game, the B strategy of seeing player A’s demand and playing a best reply weakly
dominates all other strategies. Assuming once more that B does not play dominated
strategies, the equilibrium demands for the No Commitment game is the same as for
the Unobserved Commitment game.
2.5 Remarks
2.5.1 Physical Timing Eﬀects
From a game-theoretic point of view, the Unobserved Commitment and No Commit-
ment games are the same: it does not matter that player B’s decision whether or not
to see player A’s demand or not is made at diﬀerent times (before or after player A
makes his demand), since in both games B’s information decision is not observed by
player A. In both games, therefore, player B should decide to see player A’s demand.
So why study both games? There were two reasons. First, we wish to compare the
Commitment game with a game where there is the same strategic move available, but
where this move is not observed by player A. This is the Unobserved Commitment
game. Second, it is from the experimental games literature known that situations
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that diﬀer only in the physical timing but not the observability of moves can generate
diﬀerent observed behavior. This phenomenon is refered to as ‘physical timing eﬀects’,
or ‘virtual observability’. See, for example, Gu¨th, Huck, and Rapoport (1989), Huck
and Mu¨ller (2005), and Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004). In our context, the fact
that player B in the Unobserved Commitment game makes his information decision
ﬁrst could, although the decision is not observed by player A, make player B more
likely to avoid information than in the No Commitment game, where B makes his
information decision after player A. Comparing behavior in the Unobserved Commit-
ment and the No Commitment game allows us to see whether physical timing eﬀects
per se inﬂuences B’s strategic move. Diﬀerences in physical timing alone could also
have an eﬀect on player A’s demand. In the No Commitment game, player A makes
his demand before, whereas player A in the Unobserved Commiment game makes his
demand after B has made his information decision. Although theory says there should
be no diﬀerence, does player A make more aggressive demands in the former than in
the latter game? Our data allow us to see whether this is the case.
2.5.2 Fairness and Reciprocity
The experimental game literature has documented the relevance of reciprocity and
fairness concerns; see Camerer (2003). Could it be that subjects perfectly understand
and appreciate the logic of strategic moves, but they avoid making them because they
believe that their opponent due to such motivations could react negatively to the
strategic move? If so, fairness and reciprocity would confound the cognitive aspects
that are our key focus. Note, however, that in our treatments such fairness and
reciprocity concerns should not deter player B from making the strategic move: in the
Commitment game, player B, by making the strategic move of avoiding information,
merely establishes an equal payoﬀ distribution, and not making the strategic move
would give B very little. While it is true that player B by making the strategic move
lowers player A’s payoﬀ compared to what player A would get if B did not make the
strategic move, the strategic move crucially does not give player B more than player
A, and this should reduce the extent to which a strategic move by player B violated
player A’s sense of fairness or reciprocity.
Of course, in the Commitment game player B’s own desire to establish a fair
payoﬀ distribution reinforces the desirability of making the strategic move of avoiding
information about player A’s demand. However it remains the case that B, if he
decides not to see player A’s demand, must have understood that it is only by making
the strategic move of not seeing player A’s demand that he can induce player A to
help establishing a fair payoﬀ distribution.
2.5.3 Comparing Demands
The theory predicts that if in the Commitment game player B decides to see player A’s
demand then player A will demand almost all the money and B will demand almost
zero. The same is predicted to happen in the Unobserved Commitment and No Com-
mitment games. It is well-known from the experimental literature that such extreme
payoﬀ distributions often do not occur. In the Ultimatum game, for example, the Pro-
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poser typically gets between 60 and 70 % of the available money. These moderated
payoﬀ distributions have been attributed to fairness concerns or to the ﬁrst mover’s
fear that the second mover will reject very low oﬀers. See, for example, the discus-
sion in Camerer (2003). We should expect a similar moderation in our experiment.
By collecting data from the Benchmark game, we can measure the strength of these
moderating factors. Taking these considerations into account, the moderated hypoth-
esis is that demand behavior in the Unobserved Commitment and No Commitment
treatments will be the same and, furthermore, that these should be indistinguishable
from the demand behavior in the Benchmark game.
3 Experimental Design and Procedure
The experiments took place in the spring and fall of 2006 at the Laboratory for Experi-
mental Economics (LEE) at University of Copenhagen, Denmark. The experiment was
fully computerized, using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 1999). For recruitment
Greiner’s ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004) was used.
3.1 Participants
In total 254 participants, recruited from across the University of Copenhagen, partic-
ipated in the experiment. Participants received a show-up fee of 50 Danish Kroner
(DKK), equal to about US $ 9 at the time of the experiment. On average a session
lasted 45 minutes. Across all treatments, average earnings, including the show-up fee,
was DKK 171.6, or about $ 30.9.
Table 1 provides some information about the treatments, sessions, and number of
participants.
Treatment No. of sessions No. of participants
BM 4 74
C 4 72
UC 3 44
NC 4 64
Table 1: Overview of treatments and sessions. BM = Benchmark; C = Commitment;
UC = Unobserved Commitment; No Commitment treatment.
3.2 Experimental Procedure
After entering the laboratory, each participant was seated in front of a computer. All
computers were separated by cubicles and no verbal or visual communication between
participants took place during the experiments. Once all participants had read the
instructions, a test was distributed (instructions and tests are in the Appendix). When
all students had answered the test questions, the experimenters checked all answers.
If a participant gave an incorrect answer to a question, he was asked to try again.
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Any questions about the instructions or the test were answered privately. Once all
participants had answered all test questions correctly, this was announced and the
experiment started.
To allow for learning, the experiment consisted of 15 periods. At the start of the
experiment, each participant was randomly given the player A or the B player role. A
participant stayed in the same role for all 15 periods. In each period one A participant
was randomly matched with a B participant.
In each period the sum X was given by 100 points. The set of feasible point
demands were {0, 1, 2, ..., 99, 100}. The A and the B participant each had to demand
a number of points from this sum. If the sum of the demanded points did not exceed
100 points, each participant earned the number of points that he/she demanded. If
the sum of the two demands exceeded 100 points, each earned zero points. After
each period both participants were informed about each other’s choices and their own
earnings. After the last period the points a participant had earned in each period were
added and converted into Danish Kroner (DKK), using the following exchange rate:
5 points is equal to DKK 1 (so 100 points equals DKK 20, or about $ 3.6). After the
experiment, this number of Danish Kroner was, together with the show-up fee, paid
to each participant in a separate room.
The speciﬁc treatments were implemented as follows:
The Benchmark game: First participant A entered a demand. Then participant
B saw A’s demand on his screen. Then B entered his demand.
The Commitment game: First participant B irrevocably decided whether or not
to see participant A’s demand. Participant A was on his screen informed about B’s
decision and A entered a demand. If B decided to see A’s demand, B saw A’s demand
on his screen, after which B entered his demand. If B decided not to see A’s demand,
B was only informed that A had made his demand. B then entered his demand.
Unobserved Commitment game: First participant B irrevocably decided whether
or not to see participant A’s demand. Participant A, knowing that B had made a de-
cision but not which one, then entered a demand. If B decided to see A’s demand, B
saw A’s demand on his screen, after which B entered his demand. If B decided not
to see A’s demand, B was only informed that A had made his demand, after which B
entered his demand.
No Commitment game: First participant A entered a demand. Then participant
B decided whether or not to see A’s demand. If B decided to see A’s demand, B saw
A’s demand on his screen, after which B entered his demand. If B decided not to see
A’s demand, B was on his screen informed only that A had made his demand, after
which B entered his demand.
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4 Experimental Data
4.1 Player B’s Information Decision
We ﬁrst compare across treatments the percentage of participant Bs who decided to
see A’s demand. Figure 1 shows these percentages for each of the 15 periods, for
the Commitment (C), Unobserved Commitment (UC), and No Commitment (NC)
treatments.
Figure 1: Percentage of B participants who decide to see A’s demand in the various
treatments.
In the Commitment treatment the percentage of participant Bs who decide to see
A’s demand initially exceeds 60 %. The percentage falls steadily over time, however,
and towards the end fewer than 15 % of Bs decide to see A’s demand. The average
percentage is 29.3 %. In the No Commitment treatment the percentage of participant
Bs who see A’s demand ﬂuctuates between 80 and 95 %. The average percentage is
88.8 %. Unlike the Commitment treatment, it does not seem that much learning takes
place. In the Unobserved Commitment treatment there is a initially a slight drop in
the percentage of Bs who become informed, but the percentage picks up over time and
approaches the theoretical prediction. The average percentage is 81.8 %.
On average, and especially in the earlier periods, fewer participant Bs decide to see
A’s demand in the Unobserved Commitment than in the No Commitment treatment.
This can be interpreted as evidence of a physical timing eﬀect: since B moves ﬁrst
in the UC game but second in the NC game, he decides to avoid information about
A’s demand more often in the ﬁrst than in the second game. As shown by Figure
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1, however, over time behavior in the Unobserved and No Commitment treatments
become indistinguishable. From period nine and onwards, it is hard to see any dif-
ference. There is therefore little evidence of a systematic and robust physical timing
eﬀect on the B participants’ information decision.
Table 2 repeats the average across-period percentages of B participants who de-
cided to see A’s demand in the treatments. These across-period averages conﬁrm the
message given by ﬁgure 1: The proportion of Bs who decided to see A’s demand in
the Unobserved and the No Commitment treatments diﬀer signiﬁcantly (chi-square
test, X2 = 14.21, p < 0.001). This result is however made less relevant by the already
mentioned fact that B’s information decision in the two treatments become more and
more similar over time.
C UC NC
29.3 81.8 88.8
Table 2: The average across-period percentage of B participants who decided to see
A’s demand in the C, UC, and NC treatments.
All in all, there is strong evidence that the B participants over time in each treat-
ment learn to make the predicted strategic move. The learning is however asymmetric:
it takes more time to learn to avoid information in the Commitment game than it takes
to obtain the information in the Unobserved Commitment and in the No Commitment
game. This is quite intuitive: in most everyday situations information is thought of as
being desirable (see Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber, 2006). When put in an unusual
strategic situation like the Commitment game, decision makers need time to unlearn
their homegrown propensity to seek information. There is some evidence of a physical
timing eﬀect on B’s information decision in the ﬁrst periods, but the eﬀect diminishes
over time.
4.2 A Closer Look at The Commitment Treatment
Figures 2 and 3 below show participant A’s and B’s average demands and earnings in
each period in the Commitment treatment, conditional on whether or not B decided
to see A’s demand. Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix shows the relative frequency
distributions of A and B demands and earnings, respectively.
Demands Figure 2 shows that in the Commitment treatment the A and B demands
vary strongly with B’s information decision, in the direction predicted by the theory.
When B decides not to see A’s demand, both participants tend to demand half of
the 100 points. Indeed, A demanded 50 in 343 out of the 382 cases (89.8 %) where
B decided not to see A’s demand. In 337 out of the same 382 cases (88.2 %), B
demanded exactly half. Pooling all A and B demands across periods, the average A
and B demand when B decides to see A’ demand is 49.5 and 50.2, respectively. Figure
4 in the Appendix shows the relative frequency distributions of participant A and
B demands. When B decides to see A’s demand, A demands more and B demands
less. The average across-period A and B demand are 63.3 and 42.8, respectively.
Comparing across treatments, these A demands are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
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Figure 2: Average participant A and B demands in the Commitment treatment, con-
ditional on B’s information decision.
at any conventional signiﬁcance level (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, z=12.8), as are
the B demands (z=-8.22).
Earnings As is the case for their demands, participants’ earnings in the Commit-
ment game varies systematically with B’s information decision. Figure 3 shows that
when B decides not to see A’s demand, the A and B earnings are both strongly concen-
trated on 50, the earnings from the equal split. In more than 88 % of all encounters,
the 100 points are split equally. When B decides to see A’s demand, the earnings
distributions are much more dispersed. Figure 5 in the Appendix shows that the A
and B earning distributions diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test. A earnings: z = 4.91. B earnings: z = −10.21).
Participant B is as predicted signiﬁcantly better oﬀ when he decides not to see A’s
demand than when he decides to do so. The across-period average B earnings are 46.3
and 34.6, respectively. For participant A, the comparison of earnings is less obvious.
The across-period averages are 46.3 and 45.9, respectively. Considering only these very
similar averages, however, neglects the fact that, as shown in Figure 5 in the Appendix,
there is considerable dispersion in A’s demands and earnings when A learns that B
decided to see his demand. About 25 % of A’s earn half of the points, and almost the
same percentage earn zero. The remaining 50 % of the A participants earn between
55 and 85 % of the points. The top panel in Figure 6 in the Appendix shows the
expected payoﬀ to participant A from making various demands in the Commitment
treatment when B decides to see A’s demand, given the observed B demand behavior.
The demand of 65 maximizes A’s expected money earnings. Nevertheless, other A
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Figure 3: Average participant A and B earnings in the Commitment treatment, con-
ditional on B’s information decision.
demands such as 50, 60, and 75 do not give a radically lower expected money payoﬀ,
and this can explain the observed dispersion in the observed A demands.
Agreements and Eﬃciency We measure eﬃciency as the proportion of the total
available payoﬀ (100 points in each encounter) that was paid out to participants.
When participant B decides not to see A’s demand, eﬃciency is 92.4 %, while it
is 77.1 % when B decides to see A’s demand. This diﬀerence in eﬃciency can be
explained by considering the diﬀerence in agreements (when xA + xB ≤ 100). Out of
the 158 A-B encounters where B decides to see A’s demand, agreement occurred in
120 cases, a proportion of 0.76. Out of the 382 cases where B decided not to see A’s
demand, there was agreement in 356 cases, a proportion of 0.93. This diﬀerence in
proportions is statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance level (Chi-square
test, X2 = 30.2).
The reason for this strong diﬀerence in agreements can be explained as follows.
When participant B decides to see A’s demand, A reacts by making higher demands,
and these in turn make B more likely to ‘punish’ A by demanding more than the
residual, 100 − xA, thereby giving each participant a zero payoﬀ. The lower panel
in Figure 6 in the Appendix shows, for the case where B decided to see A’s demand
in the Commitment treatment, the proportion of B demands, made conditionally on
observing some A demand, that lead to disagreement. We see that as A’s demands
increases from 50 and beyond, such ‘spiteful’ B behavior increases.
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Is There Any Evidence That Participant A Is Inﬂuenced By Fairness or
Reciprocity When Participant B Makes the Strategic Move? In Section 2.5
it was noted that players might avoid making strategic moves if they feared an adverse
reaction by the other player. Such a reaction could be fueled by fairness or reciprocity
concerns. Our design sought to minimize the presence of this factor. The data suggest
that this has been accomplished: If in the Commitment treatment participant A
becomes upset when learning that B decided not to see A’s demand, we should expect
A to ‘punish’ B by making a ‘spiteful’ demand, that is a demand large enough to
result in disagreement. More precisely, to the extent that A plausibly believes that B
will demand 50 when B decides not to see A’s demand, a spiteful A should demand
more than 50. The data show that out of the 382 encounters where B decides not to
see A’s demand, A made a demand exceeding 50 in only 5 encounters. There is thus
no evidence that any fairness or reciprocity concerns matter for participant A when
he learns that B decides to commit to not seeing A’s demand.
4.3 Across-Treatment Comparisons
Table 3 shows the average A and B demands (denoted xA and xB), average point
earnings (πA and πB), and eﬃciency (πA + πB) in the treatments. In the Unobserved
Commitment (UC) and No Commitment (NC) treatments A’s demands do, by deﬁ-
nition, not vary with B’s information decision. Also, the reported B earnings in the
ﬁrst and last row is not a typo; the earnings diﬀer only in the second decimal (they
equal 34.62 and 34.64, respectively).
xA xB πA πB πA + πB
BM 60.2 43.4 48.9 34.6 83.5
C: B does not see A’s demand 49.6 50.2 46.1 46.3 92.4
C: B sees A’s demand 63.3 42.8 45.9 31.2 77.1
UC: B does not see A’s demand 59.9 49 23.8 21.4 45.2
UC: B sees A’s demand 59.9 43.6 46.6 33.7 80.3
NC: B does not see A’s demand 59.5 48.7 28.3 25.9 54.2
NC: B sees A’s demand 59.5 47.2 46.3 34.6 80.9
Table 3: Average participant A and B demands, earnings, and eﬃciency, conditional on
B’s information decision, computed as averages across all periods. BM=Benchmark.
C= Commitment, UC = Unobserved Commitment, NC = No Commitment.
Does Observable Commitment Enhance Eﬃciency? In the BM treatment,
participant B exogenously sees A’s demand, whereas B in treatment C can visibly
commit to not seeing A’s demand. According to the theory, outcomes should be
fully eﬃcient in both the Benchmark and the Commitment treatment. Let us see
how this compares with observed behavior. In the Benchmark treatment eﬃciency
is 83.5. As shown in Table 3, when B in the Commitment treatment commits to
not seeing A’s demand, eﬃciency is 92.4 (in terms of the frequency of agreements, in
the Benchmark treatment 464 out of 555 encounters, a proportion of 0.83, results in
agreement; when B does not see A’s demand in the Commitment treatment, agreement
occurs in 356 out of 382 encounters, a proportion of 0.93; the diﬀerence in proportions
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is strongly signiﬁcant: Chi-square test, X2 = 18.2). But when B in the Commitment
treatment commits to see A’s demand, eﬃciency is only 77.1 (when in the Commitment
treatment participant B decides to see A’s demand, agreement occurs in 120 out of 158
encounters, a proportion of 0.76; on comparing with the Benchmark treatment, the
diﬀerence in proportions is strongly signiﬁcant: Chi-square test, X2 = 4.36). Overall,
eﬃciency in the Commitment treatment is 87.4 (in the Commitment treatment overall,
there is agreement in 476 out of 540 encounters, a proportion of 0.88; on comparing
with the Benchmark treatment, the diﬀerence in proportions is strongly signiﬁcant:
Chi-square test, X2 = 4.28). The opportunity for B to commit himself to not seeing
A’s demand thus has a positive eﬀect on overall eﬃciency, and when B makes the
predicted commitment to not seeing A’s demand, the positive eﬀect is strongest, giving
an almost 10 percentage point eﬃciency increase, from 83.5 to 92.4 %.
When B in the Commitment treatment decides to see A’s demand, the game is
formally the same as the Benchmark game. Why, then, is eﬃciency lower (77.1 %)
in the former than in the latter game (83.5 %)? Table 3 shows that A on average
makes tougher demands in the former than in the latter situation. The top panel in
Figure 8 in the Appendix shows that there is a tendency for participant A to make more
aggressive demands (demands above 70) when A in the Commitment treatment learns
that B chose to see A’s demand, than when A in the Benchmark treatment knows that
B is exogenously informed about A’s demand. One interpretation is that participant
A, when he in the Commitment treatment observes an ‘out-of equilibrium’ decision
by B to see A’s demand, revises his beliefs about B, namely assigns higher probability
to B playing a best reply to even large A demands. Participant A consequently reacts
by increasing his demand. A comparison of Figure 6 (top panel) and Figure 7 (top
panel) in the Appendix shows, indeed, that the optimal A demand in the Benchmark
treatment is 60, while it is 65 in the Commitment treatment when B decides to see
A’s demand. The more aggressive A demands in the latter treatment are therefore
quite rational.
Does Observability Enhance Eﬃciency? The overall eﬃciency rate in the Com-
mitment treatment is 87.4. In the Unobserved Commitment treatment, overall eﬃ-
ciency is 74. Not surprisingly, observability of commitment signiﬁcantly raises eﬃ-
cency: When participant B’s information decision is observed by A, B tends not to
see A’s demand, and this in turn induces A to make moderate eﬃciency-enhancing de-
mands. Non-observability results in frequent disagreement, especially when B decides
to avoid information about A’s demand, since demands then tend to be incompatible.
Is There a Physical Timing Eﬀect on Participant A’s Demands? The theory
predicts that the A participants’ demands in the Unobserved Commitment and the
No Commitment treatment will be the same – it will not matter to A whether B
has already made his information decision (as in the UC treatment) or whether B
makes it after A moves (the NC treatment). The relative frequency distributions of
demands are shown in Figure 8 in the Appendix. The average A demands in the
Unobserved and No Commitment treatments are indeed very close (59.9 % and 59.5
%, respectively). There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the demand distributions
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, z=-0.63, p = 0.26). We thus ﬁnd no evidence of a
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physical timing eﬀect on A’s demands.
Does Participant A Make the Same Demands in the Benchmark as in the
No Commitment Treatment? The theory also predicts that participant A should
make the same demands in the Benchmark treatment as in the No Commitment and
in the Unobserved Commitment treatments, because B in the two latter treatments
will decide to see A’s demand and so B will be in exactly the same situation. An alter-
native hypothesis is that A will make more cautious demands in the No Commitment
treatment, since he cannot be certain that B will decide to see A’s demand.
The distributions of A demands in the Benchmark and the No Commitment treat-
ment are shown in Figure 8 in the Appendix. The average A demands are very close,
60.2 and 59.5, respectively. However more As demand half the points in the No Com-
mitment than in the Benchmark treatment, while the opposite is true for demands
in the 70-75 range. Comparing the two distributions, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
gives z = −2.09 and p=0.018. The null hypothesis of equal demand distributions can
be rejected against the one-sided alternative, that the Benchmark demands stochasti-
cally dominate those in the No Commitment treatment, at the 5 %, but not at the 1
% level. There is thus some evidence that A’s tend to make more cautious demands
in the No Commitment treatment in the Benchmark game.
These somewhat more cautious A demands in the no Commitment treatment are
rational, given the empirical B behavior. Figure 7 in the Appendix shows the expected
payoﬀ that various A demands earn, given the empirical B behavior in the Benchmark
and No Commitment treatment. We have omitted those participant A demands that
are only rarely made (frequency below 10). It can be seen that whereas the money
maximizing A demand is 60 in the Benchmark treatment, is it only 50 in the No
Commitment treatment. We can attribute this diﬀerence to the fact that about 11 %
of the B participants decide to avoid information in the No Commitment treatment
(cf. Table 4.1), in which case they tend to demand 50. Their presence is enough to
make the 50 demand optimal for participant A.
5 Discussion
Our experiment is simple: One player has the opportunity to make a strategic move
that is predicted to aﬀect another player’s behavior. The experiment measures whether
the ﬁrst player learns to make the optimal strategic move. Is our design too simple?
We believe not. First, our results show that even in our simple Commitment game
it takes considerable time for the players to learn to make the theoretically predicted
commitment. Presumably, in a ‘too simple’, or ‘too easy’ set-up, players would either
jump straight to the prediction or would get bored and behave erratically. Our data
reveal a diﬀerent behavior. Second, we wanted to study a simple situation where
the player with the opportunity to commit would not have to worry too much about
whether the other player understands what the commitment move means. Clearly this
may fail to hold in more complicated situations, and future research should address
this issue. Third, a more complicated design could have introduced many potentially
confounding variables, and thus jeopardize internal validity.
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Our main focus was on whether decision makers understood to exploit any given
commitment possibility, not on whether they understood to create the opportunity
in the ﬁrst place. This is why we deliberately avoided specifying the ‘commitment
technology’ through which B can achieve the commitment. This creative aspect of
making strategic moves possible is, of course, important and fundamental. As de-
scribed in the Introduction, the theoretical literature has identiﬁed several possible
commitment technologies: third-party contracts and strategic delegation are particu-
larly well-known. It is also well-known that the possibility to re-negotiate contracts
can sometimes neutralize any commitment value of contracts (see for example Cail-
laud, Jullien, and Picard, 1995). Whether this prediction is descriptively adequate
seems to be yet another fruitful area for experimental research. We are only aware
of one experiment that explicitly models the commitment technology (but assumes
that contracts cannot be re-negotiated), namely the strategic delegation experiment
by Fershtman and Gneezy (2001). We describe their design in Section 6 below.
6 Related Research
Our work is related to several other strands of the literature.
6.1 Commitment Experiments
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) study strategic delegation (see for example Fershtman
and Kalai, 1997, and the references therein) using the ultimatum game. In the ﬁrst
version of this game, Proposer delegation, the Proposer has a delegate who will make
a proposal on behalf of the Proposer. The Proposer gives the delegate a compensation
scheme that states the payment the delegate will receive, conditional on the amount of
money the delegate brings back from the bargaining table. The compensation scheme
is not re-negotiable. The Proposer is given a separate hiring budget with which to pay
the delegate. Hiring a delegate is thus free in the sense that it does not reduce the
earnings from bargaining. An important restriction on the set of feasible compensation
schemes is that if the delegate end up in disagreement and so bring no money back,
the delegate is paid zero. In the second version, Responder delegation, the Responder
has a delegate and gives the delegate a similar compensation scheme. Fershtman and
Gneezy also run a treatment with optional Proposer delegation. All their experiments
used one-shot games, so unlike us they do not study learning.
The data show that Proposers beneﬁt from having a delegate, compared to the
no-delegate game. Under optional delegation, 75 % of Proposers decides to hire a
delegate and the observed behavior is much the same as under mandatory delegation.
Theoretically, however, the Proposer should not beneﬁt (or be hurt) from using a
delegate: he can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer himself. On the basis of further
experiments, Fershtman and Gneezy conclude that a ‘hostage’ interpretation is the
best explanation for why Proposers are better oﬀ using delegates. The reason is that,
in their design, if the Responder rejects the delegate’s oﬀer, both the delegate and the
Proposer get zero. This can induce the Responder to be less likely to reject any given
oﬀer than when there is no delegate. The delegate can thus be used by the Proposer
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as a hostage or a shield behind which low oﬀers can be made. The data show that
Proposers indeed exploit this by inducing their delegates to make lower oﬀers.
For the Responder delegation is theoretically optimal since this acts a commitment
device to reject even large oﬀers. Indeed, when the compensation scheme is observable
to the Proposer the Responder should choose a compensation scheme that induces the
delegate to only accept the largest feasible oﬀer. This can be done by only paying
the delegate if she returns with exactly this share of the available money. The data
show that with delegation Responders get 48.8 % of the money and Proposers get
39.4 %. Without Responder delegation, the Responder gets 39.2 % and the Proposer
49.2 %. Responders tend to design the compensation schemes such that delegates
who return with substantial shares of the money are rewarded more, but these shares
are far from the predicted maximal share. Indeed, not a single Responder chooses
the theoretically predicted compensation scheme (see their Table A6). Responders
are thus reluctant to fully exploit their commitment power by choosing the predicted
compensation scheme. This is perhaps not so surprising: When using a delegate
with an observable compensation scheme, the Responder in eﬀect is Proposer in the
ultimatum game and the Proposer becomes the Responder. The ﬁnding that the
Responder does not induce the delegate to accept only very large oﬀers is thus evidence
of the usual moderating fairness and reciprocity eﬀects seen in ultimatum games.
Poulsen and Tan (2006) use the ultimatum game to study how the willingness to
exercise a commitment opportunity interacts with whether the opponent will choose
to observe the commitment or not. In their main treatment the Responder commits to
a smallest acceptable oﬀer (SAO). The Proposer at the same time decides whether or
not, to observe (at no cost) the Responder’s SAO. Then the Proposer makes an oﬀer
and the Responder accepts or rejects, as determined by the chosen SAO. This move
protocol is somewhat similar to the No Commitment treatment in the present study,
except that here player A (corresponding to the Responder in Poulsen and Tan) moves
physically before player B (Proposer). Moreover, and crucially, their experiment does
not contain an analogue to our Commitment treatment.
The data show that many Proposers refuse to be informed about the Respon-
der’s SAO and simply oﬀer one-half. Also, among those Proposers who decide to
be informed many refuse to oﬀer most of the money even when they know that the
Responder has chosen the largest SAO. Responders tend to choose larger SAO when
Proposers can be informed, compared to the baseline where Proposers cannot decide
to condition oﬀers on the Responder’s SAO. Nevertheless, the increase is much smaller
than predicted. Thus, much as in Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), the willingness to
aggressively exercise the commitment option is dampened by the, justiﬁed, belief that
the opponent will be inﬂuenced by fairness and reciprocity concerns.
As already mentioned in Introduction, in the present experiment the strategic move
of avoiding information does not give the person making it much more than the other,
but merely neutralizes the opponent’s initial advantage. In this sense the commitment
move of avoiding information is less ‘aggressive’ than the commitments in Fershtman
and Gneezy (2001) and Poulsen and Tan (2006). Viewed in this light, it is natural
that most players in the current experiment over time learn to optimally exercise their
commitment option.
Andreoni (2005) examines commitment in the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and
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McCabe, 1995). In his buyer-seller version of the game, the buyer (trustor) decides
how much to pay to the seller (trustee) and the seller then decides on the quality of
the item. In this game, the buyer will pay little since the seller will always deliver
low quality. In the game with commitment, the seller can choose to move ﬁrst and
irrevocably commit to a ‘satisfaction guaranteed’ policy, according to which the buyer
has the right to annul the deal and get his money back. This guarantee is predicted
to enhance eﬃciency, since the buyer no longer has to worry about being cheated by
the seller.
Andreoni’s experimental data shows that most sellers over time learn to oﬀer the
guarantee, and eﬃciency is signiﬁcantly enhanced. In this sense, his results comple-
ment ours. However, an important diﬀerence between Andreoni’s and our design is
that the strategic move of oﬀering a satisfaction guaranteed is predicted to (weakly)
enhance both parties welfare. In our experiment the strategic move is predicted to
redistribute surplus from one side to another (although, as discussed earlier, our data
show that there is indeed a positive eﬀect on overall eﬃciency). Intuitively, the fact
that in Andreoni’s design the strategic move makes both parties better oﬀ makes it
more attractive and obvious for subjects to make the strategic move in his than in our
design.
Van Huyck, Battalio, and Walters (1995) study commitment in a peasant-dictator
game, a game very similar to the trust or investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and Mc-
Cabe, 1995). In the Discretion version of their game, the peasant decides how much
to invest and the dictator then decides how much of the investment return to tax. In
the subgame-perfect equilibrium the dictator appropriates any surplus created by the
peasant, and hence the peasant makes no investment. In the second version, Com-
mitment, the dictator irrevocably commits to a tax rate before the peasant makes his
investment decision. This leads the dictator to choose a lower tax rate and so the
peasant makes a positive investment. Both the dictator and the peasant are (for the
peasant, weakly) better oﬀ under Commitment than under Discretion. Their experi-
mental data support these predictions: tax rates and investments depend signiﬁcantly
on the treatment, and eﬃciency in the Commitment treatment is twice as large as
under Discretion.
In Van Huyck et al’s experiment the Dictator exogenously moves before or after
the peasant; he cannot choose when to set the tax rate (before or after the peasant
moves). Thus their experiment does not consider the issue we are interested in, namely
whether dictators would understand that their tax revenue is larger if they committed
to a tax rate before the peasant moves. Also, in their study the commitment move is,
as in Andreoni (2005), predicted to be eﬃciency-enhancing, whereas it in our design
is predicted to be eﬃciency-neutral and to re-distribute money from one player to
another.
6.2 Commitment and Physical Timing Eﬀects
In an interesting paper, Huck and Mu¨ller (2005) investigate whether the option to
‘burn money’ in a Battle-of-the-Sexes game helps a player to select his preferred out-
come (see Ben-Porath and Dekel, 1992, and Van Damme, 1989). The theoretical
prediction, using a forward-induction argument, is that a player will decide not to
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burn money and that the players’ will select the player’s preferred equilibrium. Huck
and Mu¨ller ﬁnd that when subjects move sequentially, the theory predicts actual be-
havior well. But when the game is implemented in the normal form, behavior is very
diﬀerent. This diﬀerence leads Huck and Mu¨ller to consider the hypothesis (among
others) that the diﬀerence is driven by a physical timing eﬀect, namely by the fact
that the player with the opportunity to burn money moved ﬁrst. Investigating certain
variations of the basic game, their data reveal a strong physical timing eﬀect that
goes beyond the ’virtual observability’ eﬀect already known in the literature (see for
example Weber, Camerer, and Knez, 2006).
We did not ﬁnd strong physical timing eﬀects, neither on player B’s information
decision nor on the demands made. The results from the existing experimental liter-
ature help to explain why. First, our underlying bargaining game is sequential and
asymmetric. This means that physical timing cannot work as a symmetry breaker (as
in Huck and Mu¨ller, 2005). Second, since player B makes his demand after player A in
all our treatments, player B is in a ‘weak’ position. The fact that in the Unobserved
Commitment treatment player B makes an unobserved information decision before
player A can not, according to the data, compensate for this weakness. Third, in the
Unobserved Commitment game, deciding not to see player A’s demand is a weakly
dominated strategy for player B. As pointed out by Gu¨th, Huck, and Rapoport (1998),
these factors tend to weaken any physical timing eﬀect. See also the ﬁndings in Weber,
Camerer, and Knez (2006) and Huck and Mu¨ller (2005).
6.3 The Observability of Commitment
It is intuitive and well-known that observability of the strategic move is crucial, see
Schelling (1960). Just how crucial observability is was made clear in Bagwell’s (1995)
inﬂuential article. Analysing the Stackelberg game, Bagwell assumes there is a, possi-
bly very small, probability that the follower receives a wrong signal about the leader’s
chosen action. He shows that this removes the leader’s ﬁrst mover advantage. More
precisely, the only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game with imperfect ob-
servability is the Cournot equilibrium. Bagwell’s provocative result sparked a rich
subsequent theoretical and experimental literature, investigating the robustness of his
analysis. See, for example, Van Damme and Hurkens (1997), Huck and Mu¨ller (2000),
Gu¨th, Mu¨ller, and Spiegel (2006), Hurkens and Vulkan (2006), and the references
therein.
Given the importance of the extent and nature of observability, it is interesting
to endogenize the follower’s decision whether or not to observe the leaders’ choice,
and our work can be seen as an experimental contribution. We give the follower a
straightforward observe/not observe choice. Our theoretical and empirical results are
straightforward: the follower should decide not to observe the leader’s action only
when this decision is observed by the leader. Our data show that subjects learn this
over time. In an interesting paper, Vardy (2004) in a theoretical model examines the
role of costly observability. The follower can, after the leader has made his choice, pay
to observe the leader’s choice (this move structure corresponds to our No Commit-
ment Game). If the follower pays, he observes the leader’s action without error. Vardy
shows that any strictly positive observation cost eliminate the Stackelberg equilibrium.
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However, for low cost there exists a mixed ‘noisy’ equilibrium that, as the cost be-
comes small, converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium. In an experimental companion
paper, Morgan and Vardy (2004) investigate the empirical relevance of these diﬀerent
equilibria. They vary the observation cost and ﬁnd that the frequency wiith which
followers pay to observe the leader’s choice is a decreasing function of the observation
cost. The leader keeps his ﬁrst mover advantage for low cost, but observed overall
play is inconsistent with the ‘noisy’ equilibrium.
6.4 Games with Endogenous Moves
Our paper is related to the literature endogenising the order of moves in games. These
games are called ‘timing games’. See for example Fonseca, Huck, and Normann (2005),
and the references therein. Most of the experiments have been using dupoly games,
and our design and results can be seen as making a contribution to the endogenous
timing literature by studying bargaining. More precisely, the formal structure of our
Commitment game corresponds to a bargaining game with endogenous timing, and
with observable delay (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990). Player B decides visibly to
player A whether to play a sequential Nash Demand Game with himself as informed
second-mover or as an uninformed second-mover. The latter game is equivalent to
a simultaneous-move Nash Demand Game. In the Unobserved Commitment game,
player B makes the same decision but player A does not know what game B has
chosen to play. Still, choosing to be an informed second mover is as described earlier
a weakly dominant strategy for player B in the Unobserved Commitment game, and
we observe that most player Bs behave as predicted. The predictions made by the
theory of endogenous timing are borne out for our situation, when suﬃcient learning
has taken place.
7 Conclusion
Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments, such as ‘burning one’s
bridges’. Since such strategic moves can appear counterintuitive and could be too
complicated for people to use in practice, we conducted an experiment to see whether
people actually make the predicted strategic move. Our data show that the experi-
mental subjects do, but after substantial time, learn to make the predicted strategic
move. Our experiment was simple in that it did not explicitly model the commitment
technology. Future work should consider this and also how players create their com-
mitment opportunities. The author is currently involved in such experimental work
and hopes he can soon report some experimental results.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Additional Figures
Figure 4: Relative frequency distribution of participant A and B demands in the
Commitment treatment, conditional on B’s information decision.
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Figure 5: Relative frequency distribution of participant A and B earnings in the
Commitment treatment, conditional on B’s information decision.
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Figure 6: The top panel shows, for the Commitment treatment when B decided to
see participant A’s demand, the expected payoﬀs to various A demands given the
empirical B demands. The lower panel shows, for the Commitment treatment when B
decided to see A’s demand, the proportion of B demands that, conditional on a given
A demand, led to disagreement. Note: participant A demands with frequency below
10 have been ignored.
23
Figure 7: The expected payoﬀs to various participant A demands, given the observed
B demand behavior, in the Benchmark (top panel) and No Commitment treatments
(lower panel). Note: participant A demands with frequency below 10 have been
ignored.
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Figure 8: Relative frequency distribution of A and B demands in various treatments.
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8.2 Instructions
The instructions were in English and are reproduced below.
8.2.1 Benchmark Treatment
Welcome to this experiment! The purpose of the experiment is to analyze decision
making. Please read these instructions carefully. From now on please do not commu-
nicate with the other participants. If you have any questions, give notice by raising
your hand. We will then answer your questions privately.
All participants in this experiment have been recruited in the same way as you,
and you all have the same instructions.
In the experiment you can earn money. How much money you earn depends on
your decisions and on the decisions made by the other participants you will interact
with. During the experiment all money amounts are given in ‘points’. At the end of
the experiment, the total amount of points you have earned is converted into Danish
Kroner, by using the following exchange rate:
5 points is equal to 1 Danish Kroner
All decisions remain anonymous. You will not be informed about the identity of
other participants, and no other participant will be informed about your identity. You
receive your ﬁnal payment in Danish Kroner in cash and this is done in private.
The experiment consists of 15 periods. At the start of the experiment, you will
be randomly given one of two diﬀerent roles, A and B. Half of the participants are
given the A role and the other half are given the B role. Those participants given the
A role are called ‘A participants’, or just ‘A’. Those given the B role are called ‘B
participants’, or just ‘B’. Your role is the same in all 15 periods.
In each period one A participant will interact with one B participant. It will be ran-
domly decided at the beginning of each period which A participant will interact with
which B participant. You interact with the other participant through the computer
terminal you are placed in front of.
Calculation of earnings:
In each period, there is a sum of 100 points available. The A and the B participant
each have to demand a number of points from this sum. This demand must be a whole
number between 0 and 100 (both included). If the sum of the demanded points made
by A and B does not exceed 100 points, each earns the number of points that he/she
demanded. If the sum of the two demands exceeds 100 points, each of you earns zero
points. This is repeated here: Suppose A demands a points and suppose B demands
b points. Then earnings for this period are calculated as follows:
• If a + b ≤ 100, A gets a points and B gets b points.
• If a + b > 100, A gets zero points and B gets zero points.
Timing of decisions:
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In each period, A makes his/her demand ﬁrst. Then B sees what A has demanded,
and B next makes his/her own demand. Finally both participants are informed about
the two demands, the total demand, and their own earnings. This is repeated here:
1. A makes his/her demand
2. B sees what A has demanded
3. B makes his/her demand
4. The two participants are informed about both participant’s choices and their
own earnings
After this a new period begins, and you will be randomly matched with one of
the participants in the other role. After the last period, the points you have earned
in each of the 15 periods will be added and converted into Danish Kroner, using the
exchange rate from above. This number of Danish Kroner is then paid to you in cash,
together with the show-up fee of 50 Danish Kroner.
The computer screens:
The computer screens used in this experiment are quite simple to navigate in.
However, if you during the experiment have any questions regarding how to use the
screens, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you. On the
computer screen, in the upper right corner, you will see how much time (in seconds)
remains to make your decision. Please note that even if you run out of time, you can
still make a decision, but please try to respect the time limit. Demands are made by
activating the ‘My demand’ box using the mouse and then typing in your demand
using the keyboard. When you have made your decision, please press the ‘OK’ button
in the lower right corner. Similarly, when you have read the summary of the decisions,
press the ‘Continue’ button to proceed.
If you at any time need to make some calculations, you are welcome to use the pen
and the blank sheets of paper that have been provided.
In a moment we will ask you to answer some questions in a short test to make sure
you have understood the rules.
8.2.2 No Commitment Treatment
The instructions for this treatment diﬀers from the other treatment instructions only
in the paragraph ‘Timing of Decisions’, which is reproduced here:
Timing of decisions:
In each period, A makes his/her demand ﬁrst. After this B decides whether or not
he/she would like to see what A has demanded. Then B makes his/her own demand.
Finally both are informed about whether B observed A’s demand, the two demands,
the total demand, and their own earnings. This is repeated here:
1. A makes his/her demand
2. B decides if he/she wants to see what A has demanded
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3. One of the following happens:
a. If B in 2 decided to see A’s demand, then B sees what A has demanded and B
makes his/her own demand
b. If B in 2 decided not to see A’s demand, then B makes his/her demand without
knowing what A has demanded
4. The two participants are informed about both participant’s choices and their
own earnings
8.2.3 Commitment Treatment
The instructions for this treatment diﬀers from the other treatment instructions only
in the paragraph ‘Timing of Decisions’, which is reproduced here:
Timing of decisions:
In each period, A makes his/her demand before B. But before this B decides
whether or not he/she would like to observe A’s demand, and A is informed about B’s
decision. Then A makes his/her demand. Depending on B’s decision, B either sees
A’s demand or not. B then makes his/her own demand. Finally both are informed
about whether B decided to observe A’s demand, the two demands, the total demand,
and their own earnings. This is repeated here:
1. B decides whether or not he/she wants to see A’s demand before B makes
his/her own demand
2. A is informed about B’s decision in 1
3. A makes his/her demand
4. One of the following happens:
a. If B in 1 decided to see A’s demand, then B sees what A has demanded and B
makes his/her own demand
b. If B in 1 decided not to see A’s demand, then B makes his/her demand without
knowing what demand A made
5. The two participants are informed about both participant’s choices and their
own earnings
8.2.4 Unobserved Commitment Treatment
The instructions for this treatment diﬀers from the other treatment instructions only
in the paragraph ‘Timing of Decisions’, which is reproduced here:
Timing of decisions:
In each period, B ﬁrst decides whether he/she wants to see A’s demand or not
before B makes his/her own demand. B’s decision to see A’s demand or not is not
seen by A. Then A makes his/her demand. Depending on B’s decision, B either sees
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A’s demand or not. B then makes his/her own demand. At the end of the period, both
are informed about whether B decided to see A’s demand or not, the two demands,
the total demand, and their own earnings.
All this is described in detail here:
1. B decides whether or not he/she wants to see A’s demand before B makes
his/her own demand. B’s decision to see A’s demand or not is not seen by A
2. A makes his/her demand
3. One of the following happens:
a. If B in 1 decided to see A’s demand, then B sees what A has demanded and B
makes his/her own demand
b. If B in 1 decided not to see A’s demand, then B makes his/her demand without
knowing what demand A made
4. The two participants are informed about their choices and their own earnings
8.3 Tests
The following tests were handed out after participants had read the instructions.
8.3.1 Benchmark Treatment
Please answer the questions below. When you have ﬁnished please raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to you and check your answers.
Question 1: Considering the roles (A and B), which of the following statements
are correct? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of each period which role you
have:
You will have each role every second period:
You will have the same role throughout the experiment, but which one has been
randomly determined:
Question 2: Considering the matching with another participant, which of the fol-
lowing statements are correct? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of each period who you interact
with:
You will interact with the same other participant throughout the experiment:
Question 3: Suppose A demands 30 points and B demands 60 points. How many
points will each earn?
A earns: points
B earns: points
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Question 4: Suppose A demands 60 points and B demands 45 points. How many
points will each earn?
A earns: points
B earns: points
Question 5: Suppose you are A deciding how much to demand. Do you know how
much B has demanded? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
Yes:
No:
Question 6: Suppose you are B deciding how much to demand. Do you know how
much A has demanded? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
Yes:
No:
8.3.2 Unobserved Commitment and Commitment Treatment
Please answer the questions below. When you have ﬁnished please raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to you and check your answers.
Question 1: Considering the roles (A and B), which one of the following statements
is correct? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of each period which role you
have:
You will have each role every second period:
You will have the same role throughout the experiment, but which one has been
randomly determined:
Question 2: Considering the matching with another participant, which one of the
following statements is correct? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of each period who you interact
with:
You will interact with the same other participant throughout the experiment:
Question 3: Suppose A demands 30 points and B demands 60 points. How many
points will each earn?
A earns: points
B earns: points
Question 4: Suppose A demands 60 points and B demands 45 points. How many
points will each earn?
A earns: points
30
B earns: points
Question 5: When A makes his/her demand, does he/she know how many points
B has demanded? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
Always:
Depends on A’s own decision:
Depends on B’s decision:
Never:
Question 6: When B makes his/her demand, does he/she know how many points
A has demanded? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
Always:
Depends on A’s decision:
Depends on B’s own decision:
Never:
Question 7: Suppose A is deciding how much to demand. Does he/she know if B
will see A’s demand? (Please indicate your answer by ‘X’)
Always:
Depends on A’s own decision:
Depends on B’s decision:
Never:
8.3.3 Unobserved Commitment
Please answer the questions below. When you have ﬁnished, raise your hand and one
of the experimenters will come and check your answers.
Question 1: Concerning the roles (A and B), which of the following statements is
correct? (Please indicate your answer with a ‘X’)
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of each period which role you
have:
You will have each role every second period:
Your role will be randomly determined at the start, and then you will keep the
same role throughout the experiment:
Question 2: Concerning the matching with another participant, which of the fol-
lowing statements is correct? (Please indicate your answer with a ‘X’)
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of each period who you interact
with:
You will interact with the same other participant throughout the experiment:
31
Question 3: Suppose A demands 30 points and B demands 60 points. How many
points will each earn?
A earns: points
B earns: points
Question 4: Suppose A demands 60 points and B demands 45 points. How many
points will each earn?
A earns: points
B earns: points
Question 5: When A makes his/her demand, does he/she know how many points
B has demanded? (Please indicate your answer with a ‘X’)
Always:
Depends on A’s own decision:
Depends on B’s decision:
Never:
Question 6: When B makes his/her demand, does he/she know how many points
A has demanded? (Please indicate your answer with a ‘X’)
Always:
Depends on A’s decision:
Depends on B’s own decision:
Never:
Question 7: Suppose A is deciding how much to demand. Does he/she know if B
will see A’s demand? (Please indicate your answer with a ‘X’)
Always:
Depends on A’s own decision:
Depends on B’s decision:
Never:
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